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Abstract
This essay explores the limits of Turing machines concerning the modeling
of minds and suggests alternatives to go beyond those limits.
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One of the main open questions in science and philosophy since ancient
times has been how bodies relate to minds. Rene´ Descartes proposed his
famous dualism to ontologically separate the physical (res extensa) from the
mental (res cogitans). However, with Cartesian dualism one cannot relate
bodies and minds. This has led many people to propose ways of reducing
minds to the physical realm (e.g. Ashby, 1947).
Alan Turing (1950) was also interested in describing minds using only
mechanical principles. Universal Turing machines (Turing, 1937) were pro-
posed to decide whether a mechanism could produced a desired computation.
Thus, one can transform the mind-body relation into the mind-mechanism
relation (Johnson-Laird, 1987; Boden, 1988), avoiding the ontological part
of the mind-body problem. This can be formulated with the question: Can
universal Turing machines compute a process similar to a mind? Turing him-
self proposed his famous test to decide this (Turing, 1950; Proudfoot, 2011).
This question is relevant for Artificial Intelligence, since a large part of A.I.
research models aspects of human minds on machines with an architecture
inspired by Turing machines.
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Stuart Kauffman (2012) has recently argued that Turing machines are not
able to compute minds. After noting several limitations of Turing machines,
Kauffman—following others such as Penrose (1989)—suggests an alternative
in quantum mechanics. Here I defend that, even when Turing machines are
not sufficient for computing minds, quantum mechanics is not required to
provide a more viable explanation. The crucial difference between Turing
machines and human minds lies in interactions (Gershenson, 2011).
Universal Turing machines (UTMs) have been a central concept in com-
puter science and A.I. (Denning, 2010). UTMs are used to define computable
functions. They are one of the theoretical foundations of modern computers.
Still, they have limitations. Since A.I. has been working with computers
based on the concept of a UTM, it is affected by the same limitations. Al-
ternatives to classical A.I. (e.g. Rumelhart et al., 1986; Brooks, 1991) also
suffer from these limitations, since these do not depend on representations
(Gershenson, 2004).
The main limitations of UTMs—related to modeling minds—are two:
1. UTMs are closed.
2. UTMs compute—i.e. produce an output—only once they halt.
UTMs are closed because once an initial condition and a program are set,
the result will be deterministic. However, there are many phenomena where
data (in the tape or program) changes at runtime. One example of this can be
seen with coupled Turing machines (Copeland, 1997; Copeland and Sylvan,
1999). Certainly, if the interactions and updating scheme between Turing
machines (where the computation of one machine affect the data of another
machine) are deterministic and defined precisely, these could be modeled by a
UTM. Nevertheless, in most cases these are only known a posteriori, because
of computational irreducibility (Wolfram, 2002). Thus, one cannot define
the output of an “open” Turing machine, since the inputs during runtime
are unknown a priori. As opposed to UTMs, minds are constantly receiving
inputs.
Computations carried out by UTMs have to halt before an output can
be extracted from them. However, there are many computations that do
not halt (Wegner, 1998; Denning, 2011), for example, biological computation
(Mitchell, 2011) is not about computing a function, but a continuous infor-
mation processing that sustains living systems (Maturana and Varela, 1980).
Minds also fall within this category. A mind does not compute a function
and halts. A mind is constantly processing information.
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From the above arguments, it can be concluded that UTMs cannot com-
pute minds. Thus, A.I. as it stands now cannot model minds completely.
Still, this does not imply that minds cannot be computed. Now the question
is: Are there (non-Turing) mechanisms capable of computing a process similar
to a mind? If we see computation as transformation of information (Ger-
shenson, 2007), then human minds are already computing processes. Thus,
the answer is affirmative—human minds can be seen as computers—but not
very useful. Minds are computable, but how?. A more pragmatic framing
of the question would be: How can we describe computations of processes
similar to minds?. This description should enable us to understand better
cognitive processes and also to build more sophisticated artificial cognitive
systems.
As it was argued above, interactions (Gershenson, 2011) are the missing
element in UTMs. Probably this is due to a reductionist bias in science.
Classical science, since the times of Galileo, Descartes, Newton and Laplace,
has tried to simplify and separate in order to predict (Kauffman, 2000). This
is understandable, since traditional modeling is limited by the amount of in-
formation included in the model. This has naturally led to neglecting interac-
tions. However, modern computers—a product of reductionist science—have
enabled us to include much more information in our models, opening the
possibility to include interactions.
Computing with interactions (Wegner, 1998) implies models of computa-
tion that are open and that do not halt. Interestingly, modern computers—
while based on UTMs—are able to perform interactive computation. It
should be noted that Turing-computability—which is theoretical—is different
from practical computability (in a physical computer). For example, there
are Turing-computable functions that are not computable in practice simply
because there is not enough time and/or memory in the universe. On the
other hand, computers can compute non-Turing-computable functions, such
as halting functions with the aid of an “oracle” (a posteriori). Interactions
are another example, since computers may receive inputs while processing
information and may not halt. This is positive for A.I. since it implies that
modeling minds with current computers does not imply a hardware challenge.
The remaining challenge is related to reductionism. By necessity, many
A.I. systems rely on interactions, be it with humans or with other artificial
systems. Examples include conversation systems (Pineda et al., 2007) and
agents for the Semantic Web (Hendler, 2001). However, even these systems
simplify modeling to reductionist processes, where allowed interactions are
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defined beforehand, and computations are well defined. This contrasts with
natural systems—humans included—where there is a constant interaction
with the environment (Clark, 1997) that is not predefined. The ability to
respond to unforeseen circumstances seems an obstacle for A.I. Still, there
are several examples of adaptive systems that go beyond this limitation (e.g.
Braitenberg, 1986; Bongard et al., 2006).
A.I. can describe minds in terms of computation only if this is dynamic
(changing in runtime) and continuous (non halting). This will enable artifi-
cial systems to respond to interactions which can occur at any moment and
do not stop occurring.
To achieve dynamic computation, systems should be able to be inter-
rupted and modified. New states should be able to be created and old states
should be able to be deleted.
To achieve continuous computation, systems should be programmed with
the goal of constant interaction, as opposed to producing a set of outputs.
Systems should not deliver results. Systems should deliver processes.
Dynamic, continuous computing will certainly be less predictable than
traditional computing. Still, it will have the possibility of being more creative
and adaptive, since new solutions will be constantly sought as novel situations
arise.
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